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Introduction
Ever since Sims's seminal paper (1980) , transmission of monetary policy typically has been studied using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach. In general, contractive monetary policy is found to decrease output and price level, with a maximum impact occurring after a time lag of 12-24 months (see, e.g., literature surveys by Leeper et al., 1996; Christiano et al., 1999) . Several indicators of monetary policy stance have been tested over the past three decades: a monetary aggregate (Sims, 1980) , an indicator based on minutes from meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (Romer and Romer, 1989) , non-borrowed reserves at the central bank (Eichenbaum, 1992) , and the currently most widely accepted single indicator (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992 )-the short-term interest rate (Sims, 1992) . Forward-looking agents alter their expectations before the interest rate changes. As a consequence, we observe fewer unexpected changes in monetary policy (Blinder et al., 2008) and studying actual policy shocks could thus paint a less than complete picture of the monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, VAR models that neglect the role of communication might overestimate the length of the implementation lag.
To date, however, this subject has not been studied in the context of monetary policy transmission mechanisms, 2 even though studying the dynamics of the short-term interest rate, output, and prices after (gradual) changes in communication could be insightful. 1 Theoretically, central bank communication matters (i) in the absence of a stationary economy or monetary policy rule or (ii) in the presence of non-rational expectations (Blinder et al., 2008) . 2 Note that Romer and Romer (1989) use central bank communication (minutes) to identify exogenous shocks in monetary policy. However, it is not clear why central bank communication should be treated as exogenous from macroeconomic developments or the short-term interest rate (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998 
Data and Econometric Methodology
We utilize two variables to measure monetary policy stance. In addition to the 'classical' 3-Month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) we employ the KOF MPC. This indicator is based on a quantification of statements regarding future price stability made by the ECB President at monthly press conferences. It is constructed by balancing statements implying either (i) upside risks or (ii) downside risks to price stability against all statements on the topic of future price stability (KOF, 2007) . Conrad and Lamla (2010) show that the EUR/USD exchange rate responds to ECB communication as measured by the KOF MPC. Sturm and de Haan (2011) Although the KOF MPC does anticipate changes in the future target by two to three months (KOF, 2007) , the correlation to the interbank rate-which should capture expectations about the future target rate over the next three months-is only 0.41 over our sample period. Econometrically, we employ a VAR model as pioneered by Sims (1980) . In the benchmark case without central bank communication, we estimate the four-variable model,
where is a 4x1 vector of endogenous variables containing the harmonised index of consumer prices (CPI), the industrial production index (IP), and monetary aggregate M3 (in logs, respectively), as well as the 3-month Euribor interest rate.
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All variables enter the system as level variables (Sims and Uhlig, 1991) with three lags.
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In a second step, we add the KOF MPC to the vector of endogenous variables to test for its (additional) influence on the monetary policy transmission process. To study the dynamic impact of monetary policy on prices and output, we simulate their reaction to changes in the short-term interest rate and/or the KOF MOC. These impulse response functions are obtained by using generalized impulse responses (Pesaran and Shin, 1998) . The main advantage of this approach is that it requires no orthogonalisation of shocks and is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. Error bands are constructed by a parametric bootstrap procedure using 10,000 repetitions and show one and two standard error (SE) deviations in each direction.
Results
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses for the benchmark model that includes the short-term interest rate, but no central bank communication variable. A generalised one standard deviation (SD) shock in the short-term interest rate (14 basis points, bps) leads to a significant decrease in the price index after 14 months (after 25 months based on two SE bands). The maximum impact is found after 48 months: a hypothetical 25 bps hike lowers the price level by 26 bps. Note that the CPI reaction is significantly positive during the first five months, providing evidence for the well-known 'price puzzle' (see, e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1992;  4 Data source: ECB. As part of our robustness tests, we considered other variables in the VAR setup: EUR/USD exchange rate, euro nominal effective exchange rate, U.S. short-term interest rate, and price indicators for commodities, housing, and oil. The results presented in Section 3 of the paper are robust to the inclusion of these variables. To optimise the degrees of freedom in our estimations, we stick with the parsimonious specification.
All omitted results are available on request. 5 Out of a battery of lag-length selection criteria (sequential modified likelihood ratio test statistic, final prediction error, Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information criterion, Hannan-Quinn information criterion), we choose the lag length favoured by the majority of criteria. 6 A drawback is that by not a priori providing a structural framework for the VAR system, the error bands tend to be larger. However, the core implications of this paper hold even without a priori imposing any restrictions. Therefore, we stick with our 'theory-free' framework. Furthermore, imposing long-run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) or sign restrictions (Uhlig, 2005) do not qualitatively change the results. Sims, 1992 ). Sims's (1992) explanation for this phenomenon is intuitive: The central bank systematically responds to expectations of higher future inflation by raising the target rate but this increase is not enough to prevent inflation from actually rising in the very short-run.
Prices then do indeed increase, but decline after the monetary policy implementation lag.
Industrial production is affected in a similar way. After nine months (11 months if using two In a next step, we examine whether central bank communication plays any role in the transmission of ECB monetary policy to output and prices. We add the KOF MPC to the benchmark model and, first, explore the joint dynamics of both monetary policy indicators. Figure 3 shows the impulse responses for both variables. A generalised one SD shock in the KOF MPC (13 bps) leads to a significant increase in the short-term interest rate, with a maximum impact of 9 bps after five months. Changes discussed in communications precede changes in the short-term interest rate by about eight months, which implies that the ECB systematically uses communication to prepare the financial world for its upcoming interest 7 Other impulse responses (not shown here) are in line with a priori expectations. The short-term interest rate reacts positively to CPI and IP shocks, implying that the ECB is following a Taylor (1993) rule, and to M3 shocks (with a short time lag); CPI (with a short time lag) and IP increase after M3 shocks; finally, we have evidence for the liquidity effect as M3 goes down after shocks to the short-term interest rate. However, after making an interest move for which it provided no preparation, the central bank corrects its communication as to future monetary policy significantly downward after 10 months (13 month when using 2 SE bands). Furthermore, the maximum impact of a 25 bps hike in the short-term interest rate is lower (21 bps) than without central bank communication (55 bps) and the price puzzle is more pronounced in the former case.
Industrial production's reaction to communication again takes place with a shorter time lag than for the 3-month Euribor (7 months vs. 10 months, one SE bands; 11 months vs. 8 Other impulse responses (not shown here) are in line with a priori expectations. The short-term interest rate and the KOF MPC react positively to CPI and IP shocks, implying that the ECB is following a Taylor (1993) rule in monetary policy actions and communications, and to M3 shocks (with a short time lag); CPI (with a short time lag) and IP increase after M3 shocks; finally, we have evidence for the liquidity effect as M3 goes down after shocks to the short-term interest rate and the KOF MPC. 
IP to KOF MPC
Our results are robust to different maturities (overnight, 6-month, and 12-month) for the short-term interest rate. Furthermore, the short-term interest rate employed here is the average of daily interest rates during a particular month and also captures information after the ECB's decision, which usually takes place early in the month. In contrast, the KOF MPC includes information only up to this decision day and, thus, the timing aspect is not favouring the results for central bank communication.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the influence Our results indicate that prices and output react to a change in the inclination of future monetary policy more than to actual shocks in the target rate. Systematic central bank communication-as engaged in by the ECB-successfully manages expectations about future interest rates. Changes in communication precede changes in the short-term interest rate by about eight months. Thus, by using this channel of monetary policy, the ECB can steer inflation and output before actual interest rate changes take place.
We show that studying monetary policy transmission mechanisms these days needs to involve more than just analysing rare shocks in the short-term interest rate. 
